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Durational Residency Requirements
for In-State Tuition: Searching for




As the cost of obtaining an education at public universities in the
United States annually rises, a state school education is no longer the
affordable alternative it once was. It is simply a less expensive
possibility. At the graduate level especially, the costs of earning a
degree have grown prohibitively large, affecting not only the career
paths of many students, but also their decision to enroll in the first
place. While attending a public university in one's own state is still
the most cost-effective path to graduate education, state residency
requirements for reduced tuition operate as a deterrent to
prospective students who wish to attend a public university in one
state, but currently reside in another state.
The constitutionality of residency requirements at public
universities is an issue that the United States Supreme Court has not
adequately and thoroughly addressed. While the Supreme Court has
examined residency requirements in a variety of other contexts, such
as state laws with respect to welfare benefits,1 revenue refunds,2
medical care,3 divorce,4 and voting rights,. it has not provided a clear
framework for the scope of a constitutionally permissible tuition
requirement. In fact, the last time the Supreme Court determined the
constitutionality of a tuition residency requirement was almost thirty
4 J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2002; B.A. University
of Michigan. Many thanks to my family and friends, for love and support.
1. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), see also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489
(1999).
2. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
3. See Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
4. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
5. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
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years ago, in Vlandis v. Kline, when it held that a "permanent
irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence" violates the Due Process
Clause.6 Since Vlandis, many states have simply modified their
requirements and continue to impose residency standards on out-of-
state students that, although permissible under Vlandis, are
inequitable and arguably unconstitutional under more recent
jurisprudence. The time has come for the Supreme Court to redefine
its nebulous directive that a state has the right to "impose on a
student, as one element in demonstrating bona fide residence, a
reasonable durational residency requirement, which can be met while
in student status.,
7
Exactly what qualifies as a "reasonable" durational residency
requirement is unclear. For example, California permits college
students who enroll as nonresidents to establish bona fide residency
while enrolled, and if they can prove they have maintained their
residency for one year, while meeting other conditions, they may
qualify for lower, in-state tuition.' The California Education Code
("Code") provides that "[a] student who has been entirely self-
supporting and actually present in California for more than one year
immediately preceding the residence determination date, with the
intention of acquiring a residence therein," shall be classified a
resident, "until he or she has resided in the state for the minimum
time necessary to become a resident."9 The Code also provides three
additional criteria that help to determine whether a student is
financially independent (or self-supporting): in the year of the
reclassification or the preceding three years, the student must not
have been (1) claimed as an exemption by his parents on federal or
state taxes, (2) received more than seven hundred and fifty dollars in
financial assistance, or (3) lived in the home of his parents.
On its face, the California requirement appears to be temporary
and rebuttable, and thus would be constitutionally permissible under
Vlandis. On the other hand, an argument can be made that the
California statute is actually unconstitutional because its
requirements are arbitrary and unreasonable in the sense that a
student can establish bona fide residency and an intent to remain in
the state after graduation without living in the state for one year.
This Note will examine the constitutionality of durational residency
requirements for preferred tuition like the one in California. This
Note analyzes the judicial treatment of state residency requirements
6. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
7. Id. at 452.
8. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 68071, 68044 (West 2001).
9. Id. § 68071.
10. Id. § 68044.
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under the Equal Protection, Due Process, and Privileges or
Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Juxtaposing the
California statute against those decisions, this Note will argue that,
despite the generally accepted notion that such requirements are
constitutionally permissible, any durational residency requirement for
in-state tuition at a public university is unconstitutional.
I. Durational Residency Requirements for In-State Tuition
and the Due Process Clause
A. Vlandis v. Kline
Although the Supreme Court's modem analysis of residency
requirements began, chronologically, with an Equal Protection
analysis, the first case addressing the specific issue of tuition residency
requirements was decided on Due Process grounds.
In Vlandis v. Kline, two University of Connecticut students sued
under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, contending that they were bona
fide residents of Connecticut, and the State's classification of them as
permanent non-residents infringed their Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process and Equal Protection rights.1' Because their legal
residence was out-of-state when they applied for admission to the
University, they were permanently classified as nonresidents. The
statute required non-resident students to pay a higher, out-of-state
tuition.' The statutory scheme did not permit either student to
demonstrate that they had become bona fide Connecticut residents
entitled to reclassification as in-state students. 4
The State attempted to justify the statute's permanent and
irrebuttable presumption on three grounds.' First, that permanently
classifying out-of-state enrollees as non-residents guaranteed that
bona fide in-state students were fully subsidized.' Second, that
administrative certainty and cost efficiency favored the scheme."
Third, that the State could reasonably favor students from
Connecticut who had, or whose parents had, paid taxes to the state."'
The Court was not persuaded. Rejecting each argument, the
Court pointed to inherent inconsistencies and alternative means of
achieving the State's objectives. The Court found that plaintiffs
11. Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 444.
12. Id. at 445.
13. Id. at 442.
14. Id. at 448.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 451.
18. Id. at 449.
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adequately demonstrated their intent to remain in Connecticut, even
if they did apply to the University from out of state.'9 They
established year-round homes in the state, got drivers' licenses,
registered their vehicles, and registered to vote.20 The Court found
that rather than ensuring that bona fide residents were receiving their
full subsidies from the state, the statutory scheme guaranteed that
these two bona fide residents did not receive their full subsidies. 21
The Court found that locking in a student's residential status based
on when and from where she applied was wholly unrelated to the
State's objective.'
Secondly, while acknowledging the value of speed and efficiency,
the Court concluded that administrative ease and certainty could not,
by itself, avoid invalidity on Due Process grounds.' The fact that
reasonable alternatives existed for determining which applicants or
students were bona fide residents caused the State's standards to be
unconstitutional. 24
Finally, the Court dismissed the State's argument, that it could
presume that some applicants had made no tax contributions to the
state based on the address from which they applied, as an arbitrary
denial of Due Process.' The Court described a hypothetical student
from Connecticut whose parents were lifelong Connecticut residents,
but the student left the state to attend college and established
residency in another state.26 In such a scenario, the parents, at least,
had never stopped paying taxes in Connecticut, yet the student would
be permanently classified as an out-of-state resident when applying
for graduate school.27 Without making any effort to ensure that an
applicant was an established resident, the State's criterion was
arbitrary and unconstitutional.2
The Court recognized a legitimate state interest in maintaining
the quality of public universities and the right of bona fide residents





23. Id. at 451.
24. Id.
25. I1&
26. See id. at 450.
27. Id.
28. Id. In addition to concluding that the residency requirement violated Due Process,
the Court questioned the law's legitimacy under Equal Protection principles, citing
Carrington v. Rush, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965), and Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354
(1972).
29. Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 453. To illustrate, the Court alluded to a Minnesota residency
standard it had summarily affirmed two years earlier, in Starns v. Malkerson, which stated
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Court concluded that it would permit a state to establish a reasonable
criteria for in-state status of students to be sure that those entering
public universities from out of state solely for educational purposes
could not take advantage of in-state tuition rates.30  One such
reasonable standard, that had already been adopted by the
Connecticut Attorney General in the midst of the appeal, was that
classifications would be considered on a case by case basis, including
as relevant criteria year-round residence, voter registration, place of
filing of tax returns, driver's license, vehicle registration, marital
status, and employment.31
Significantly, the majority's analysis acknowledged the Equal
Protection analysis that was concurrently developing.32 Quoting from
Shapiro:
[E]ven if we accepted the State's argument that its statutory scheme
operates to apportion tuition rates on the basis of old and new
residency, that justification itself would give rise to grave problems
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment...
That reasoning... "would logically permit the State to bar new
residents from schools, parks, and libraries or deprive them of
police and fire protection... [and] permit the State to apportion all
benefits and services according to the past tax contributions of its
citizens. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits such an
apportionment of State services." 33
The Court implied that the Equal Protection analysis may be, in
some circumstances, applicable to durational residency requirements
for tuition. Even though access to police and fire services are
arguably basic necessities, access to libraries and parks are almost
certainly not. Access to public universities would fall within the
general category of state services, which the Court expressly
protects.3 However, by relegating the discussion to a footnote, the
majority's lack of clarity sent an ambiguous signal to lower courts that
access to higher education might not fall within the area of
fundamental rights to which the Equal Protection analysis applies.
35
Justice Marshall, in concurrence, doubted whether a one-year
residency requirement for in-state tuition residency laws could pass
that a student could not qualify as a resident for tuition purposes unless he had been a
bona fide domiciliary of Minnesota for at least a year. In that case, the residency
classification was irrebuttable, but the one-year requirement was "merely one element
which [the State] required to demonstrate bona fide domicile." See Starns v. Malkerson,
326 F. Supp. 234,238-39 (D. Minn. 1970), affd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971).
30. See Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 453-54.
31. Id. at 454.
32. See id. at 450 n.6.
33. Id (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,632-33 (1969) (emphasis added)).
34. Id
35. Id at 450.
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Equal Protection scrutiny, because of "well-established principles...
which limit the States' ability to set residency requirements for the
receipt of rights and benefits bestowed on bona fide state residents."
'
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, agreed that the
Connecticut statute violated Due Process, but reserved his decision of
what constituted a reasonable standard for a case in which the issue
was "squarely presented." 37
So, after Vlandis, a state can establish reasonable criteria for in-
state status to make certain that students who are not bona fide
residents of the state do not receive the benefit of preferential tuition
rates.18 As long as an out-of-state applicant has the opportunity to
demonstrate that she has become a bona fide resident, and that she
did not come to the state solely for educational purposes, the statute
will not presumably violate Due Process.
B. Due Process in California?
Turning to the residency rules for public universities in
California, there is a strong argument that the requirements provided
are both arbitrary and unreasonable. First, the Code mandates that a
student live in the state for one year to claim access to in-state
tuition.' Second, the Code requires students, even those who have
met the one-year test, to be financially independent from their
parents for three years.4'
Applying the rule from Vlandis, the California statute appears to
be unconstitutional on its face. First, the one-year durational
requirement is not one of several factors considered. Rather it is the
threshold requirement that must be met before other relevant criteria
are even considered.
Second, the statute is only rebuttable in the sense that an out-of-
state student can appeal his residency determination after one year.
However, during the student's first year of college, the non-resident
status cannot be challenged, even if the student has already
established an intent to remain in the state permanently after
graduation by getting his driver's license, vehicle registration, voting
registration, a permanent year-round address, or even purchasing
property.43 Moreover, financial independence is completely unrelated
to whether a student demonstrates an intent to become and remain a
36. Id
37. Id. at 455 (Marshall, J., concurring).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 68071,68017 (West 2001).
41. Id. § 68044.
42. Id. § 68017.
43. Id.
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bona fide resident. The stringent demands of the California law can
be, for many out-of-state students, impossible to overcome while
enrolled.'
Since reasonable alternatives are available for determining bona
fide residence, apart from arbitrary durational and financial
requirements, it seems that the California tuition residency
requirements are a denial of Due Process under the analysis set forth
by the Supreme Court in Vlandis v. Kline.
H. Durational Residency Requirements and the
Equal Protection Clause
A. Shapiro and Its Progeny
Before the Supreme Court addressed durational residency
requirements for tuition, it examined the constitutionality of
durational residency requirements in other contexts and created an
analytical framework based on Equal Protection principles. The
modern analysis of durational residency requirements began in
Shapiro v. Thompson, when the Supreme Court established a
relationship between the right to interstate travel and the Equal
Protection Clause." The framework created in Shapiro would
ultimately be used to gauge the constitutionality of durational
residency requirements in an array of contexts.46
In Shapiro, the Court reviewed statutes from Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia that imposed one-year
durational residency requirements on new citizens before they
became eligible for welfare benefits.'
The Court found that the specific objective of the statute was to
keep poor people out of the state.4s Though well suited for its
purpose, inhibiting the migration of the poor was constitutionally
impermissible, as an infringement on the right to travel, a
fundamental right.49 Accordingly, the Court applied strict scrutiny
44. A student who moves to California immediately after graduating from high school,
with the intention of permanently residing there, will not be eligible for in-state tuition
until his fourth year of enrollment, even if he resides there year round, has a driver's
license, and has registered to vote.
45. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,638 (1969).
46. Id (The Shapiro framework was subsequently applied to voting restrictions, Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); to medical care, Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,
415 U.S. 250 (1974); and to boat mooring privileges, Hawaii Boating Ass'n v. Water
Transportation Facilities Division, 651 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1981)).
47. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 618.
48. Id
49. Id. The right to travel has been grounded upon the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of Article IV, Section 2, in Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180 (1869), and Ward v.
analysis and struck down the residency requirements for welfare
benefits.0
Limiting the reach of its holding, the Court disclaimed the effect
of its decision on cases involving voting, professional licensing, and
"tuition-free education."'" Presumably, the Court was indicating that
it would address those situations when presented with them directly,
stating that "such requirements may promote compelling state
interests on the one hand, or, on the other, may not be penalties upon
the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate travel."52
Three years later in Dunn v. Blumenstein, the Court addressed a
statute that prohibited new residents of Tennessee from voting, in
state elections until they had been residents of the state for one year,
in other words, a durational residency requirement to vote. 3 The
Court held that the durational residency requirement classified
residents based on recent travel to Tennessee, and thus, directly
impinged on the right to interstate travel.-4
Citing Shapiro, the Court made clear that even if the residency
requirement was not designed to deter travel, and, in fact, does not
deter travel, the crucial consideration was whether the residency
requirement penalized the right to travel." The Court reaffirmed that
any classification penalizing the right to travel triggers strict scrutiny."
Although Dunn did not expressly discuss durational residency
requirements for tuition at public universities, the discussion
addressing the relative value of waiting periods in the context of
voting is insightful." Specifically, the Court stated that objective
information relevant to the question of bona fide residency is easily
confirmed and in the context of the State's interest in preventing
voting fraud, thirty days was sufficient, while three months or one
year was too much.5 In other words, the Court distinguished between
legitimate residency requirements, which, when appropriately defined
and uniformly applied, would withstand close scrutiny, and durational
Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 430 (1871); the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, in Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 181, 183-85 (1941), and Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908); the Commerce Clause, in the Passenger Cases, 7 How.
283 (1849); and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, in Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116, 125 (1958), and Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 (1965).
50. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638.
51. Id at 638 n.21.
52. Id.
53. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 331.
54. Id. at 338.
55. Id. at 340.
56. Id. at 342.
57. See id. at 348.
58. Id.
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residency requirements, imposed on bona fide residents, which are
more suspect.*"
The Court continued to develop the right to travel/Equal
Protection analysis in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County.'
There, an Arizona statute denied county-funded, non-emergency
medical care to indigent residents who had not lived in the state for at
least one year.6' Justice Marshall outlined the factors used to gauge a
law's impact on the right to travel.62 Though the degree of impact
required to trigger strict scrutiny was not clear, the primary
consideration was, again, whether the residency requirement
penalized the right to travel.63 Justice Marshall found that, though the
right to free medical care is not a fundamental constitutional right, it
was as much a "basic necessity of life" as welfare assistance. 
6
Withholding free medical care from a certain group of bona fide
residents, those that had been in the state for less than twelve months,
was an invidious classification that penalized the right to travel.6
Such a classification could only be justified by a compelling state
interest, a burden the defendant was unable to meet.'
Shapiro and its progeny indicate that statutes imposing
durational residence requirements as prerequisites to the receipt of a
fundamental right or a basic necessity penalize the right to travel and
are, therefore, subject to strict judicial scrutiny. While the Court has
not directly addressed the full scope of the right to travel/Equal
Protection analysis, the distinction between "basic necessities" or
fundamental rights, and merely "important interests," like higher
education, may leave newly arrived university students out of the
Equal Protection strict scrutiny analysis. Even if durational residency
requirements for tuition deter interstate migration, such statutes do
not necessarily penalize the right to travel because the Supreme
Court has not recognized a fundamental right to higher education.67
B. Starns and Sturgis
Starns v. Malkerson was a district court case decided early in the
development of the Shapiro framework.' The Court had summarily
59. See id. at 343.
60. See Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250,254-70 (1974).
61. Id. at 251.
62. Id. at 256.
63. Id at 257.
64. I& at 259.
65. Id. at 269.
66. Id.
67. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 35, 36 (1973) (holding no
fundamental right to state-financed public education).
68. See Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970).
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affirmed the case prior to Vlandis, though Justice Marshall later
expressed doubt about the affirmation.69
The issue in Starns was whether it was constitutionally
permissible for a state to create a "rebuttable" presumption that any
person, who had not continuously resided in that state for one year
immediately prior to becoming a student at a state university, was a
non-resident for tuition purposes.' The plaintiffs, two University of
Minnesota students, contended that the statute created two classes of
residents required to pay different tuitions based solely on the length
of time they had resided in the state.1 They argued that such a
classification was unreasonable and a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.'
The plaintiffs, relying on Shapiro, asserted that there was a
fundamental right at issue-the right to interstate movement-and
thus, strict scrutiny was the proper standard.73 They argued that the
Minnesota statute had the effect of deterring people from moving
from one state to another in order to establish residency.7
The court began its analysis with a discussion of the relevant
standards to be applied to discriminatory statutes. 5 When a statute
infringes on an individual's fundamental rights, the appropriate test is
whether such a distinction is necessary to promote a compelling state
interest. 6 However, when a fundamental right is not affected, the
classification merely needs to have a rational relation to the state
interest.7
The three-judge district court distinguished Shapiro in two
respects. First, the restriction in Shapiro was a welfare restriction that
served to exclude poor people who needed relief and thus served an
unjustifiable purpose. 8 Second, the statute in Shapiro effectively
denied a basic necessity of life to needy residents and, thus, the
deterrent effect on the needy was "readily apparent."'7 In contrast,
the court held that the Minnesota statute had no asserted purpose of
deterring out-of-state students.' Nor did the statute have an
69. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,455 (1973) (Marshall, J. concurring).
70. See Starns, 326 F. Supp. at 237.
71. Id. at 236.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 237.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 238.
76. See id. at 237; see also Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15,395 U.S. 621, 627-28
(1969).
77. See Starns, 326 F. Supp. at 238; see also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961).
78. See Starns, 326 F. Supp. at 237.
79. Id. at 238.
80. Id. at 237.
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"appreciable... chilling effect" on out-of-state students since more
than ten-percent of the enrolled students at the University of
Minnesota were nonresidents.8 Furthermore, while the court "fully
recognize[d] the value of higher education," it refused to equate that
with food, shelter, and clothing.' The court concluded that the case
did not involve an infringement of a fundamental right, and therefore
the statute would not be subjected to strict scrutiny analysis.'
Importantly, the court recognized that the statute was
irrebuttable on a practical level, as well as economically
discriminatory.' Because the statute required an individual to reside
for one year in the state for primarily non-educational purposes,
unless a student could meet the exacting criteria of living in the state
for a year prior to attending classes, that student would be
permanently classified with an out-of-state status.8 The court's
discussion exposed the constitutional uncertainty of the statute based
on its blatant imperfections and logical flaws.86
Oddly, the court seemed to accept the State's reasoning, that it
was attempting to achieve partial cost equalization between
individuals who had contributed to the state's economy through
employment, tax payments, and expenditures. 7 The Starns court
reasoned that the State had a valid interest in providing tuition-free
education to individuals whose year long residency in the state prior
to enrollment would reasonably signify an intention to remain in the
state after graduating from the university and make an even greater
contribution to the state's economy!' The court then held that a
distinction based on one-year of residency in the state prior to
enrollment was rational, not arbitrary or unreasonable, and not a
violation of Equal Protection.
One recalls Vlandis, which was decided three years later, where
the Supreme Court dismissed the same tax equalization rationale, not
only because it was an arbitrary violation of Due Process, but because
such an apportionment would present "grave" Equal Protection
problems.' The concurrence of Justices Marshall and Brennan cast






86. Id at 239.
87. Id
88. See id at 240-41.
89. Id
90. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 449 (1973).
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development of the Equal Protection analysis, which prohibited
residency restrictions for voting.
In 1973, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed another case
involving a tuition residency requirement.92 In Sturgis v. Washington,
the statute had nearly identical requirements as the statute in Starns.93
Noting the similarity of the provisions of the statute, the district court
adopted the reasoning in Starns, which the Supreme Court had
already affirmed, without opinion. 9 Because there was no recognized
fundamental right to higher education, strict scrutiny was not
applicable.95 Accordingly, the asserted purpose of basing favorable
tuition status on previous tax contributions to the state bore a
sufficiently reasonable relation to the statute.96 The court also
referred to Vlandis, which in a footnote had alluded to the statute in
Starns as a gossible example of a reasonable durational residency
requirement. Ironically, the court quoted language from Vlandis,
yet still failed to recognize the specificity of its direction or the Starns
court's own finding that the statute was, in fact, irrebuttable and
could rarely be met while the student was in attendance at the
University.
The court's misguided analysis did not go unchecked. Judge
William G. East, the sole dissenter, identified the flaws of the
majority opinion. Judge East disagreed with the reasoning in Starns,
which he believed had misread precedent and had "nurtured three
misconceptions into its untenable approval of the durational
residency requirement."9 Judge East acknowledged that the State of
Washington had no obligation to provide its residents, at public
expense, with any program of higher education, but that when it
chose to do so, it was obligated to provide that service to all of its
residents on an equal basis. He stated that the proper query for the
court was whether the statute granted plaintiffs "equity of legal
privileges with all [residents] under non-discriminatory laws."' '
Judge East also noted the important distinction between the
statute at issue, which fixed tuitional amounts to be paid by students
so that the State could recoup its own expenses incurred for providing
91. l at 455, see also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,330 (1972).




95. Id. at 41.
96. Id
97. Id. at 42 n.4.
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the program, and a "reasonable durational residence requirement"
used to evidence bona fide residency.'0 ' He found that the
Washington statute was "not intended nor geared to be a residence
evidencing or purity measure, nor could a period of one year be
logically determined to be a reasonable period of time for such a
purpose.""0 2
Finding that the statute divided the state's higher education
population into two classes, economically favoring one and
discriminating against the other, as conceded by Starns, Judge East
concluded that the proper analysis was directed by Dunn and looked
to three factors." First, the character and the basis for the class
discriminated against, i.e., residents of less than one year; second, the
individual interests affected by the classification, i.e. the economic
burden or penalty placed upon the new, recently arrived resident;
lastly, the interests of the state asserted in support of the
classifications, i.e. recouping the expenses incurred in providing the
program.'# Analyzing the statute in light of these factors, he found
that whether one looked at the economic discrimination against the
new residents or the benefit withheld by the interference with their
constitutional right of interstate travel, the heightened standard of
strict scrutiny was required.' Under strict scrutiny, the State of
Washington's interest in fiscal integrity was not sufficiently
compelling to support the discriminatory classification provided for
by the statute#'
After Sturgis, despite the vigorous dissent of Judge East, it
seemed that durational residency requirements for tuition purposes
were unanimously slated for review under a rational basis test.
Despite repeated attempts by plaintiffs to assert their Equal
Protection rights in conjunction with their fundamental right to travel,
the courts refused to recognize higher education as a fundamental
right that merited strict scrutiny.0 Nor were the courts prepared to
acknowledge the effect that durational residency requirements had on
the right to travel."' While the case for strict scrutiny found strong
support from Justices Marshall and Brennan and Judge East, the
101. Id
102. Id at 43 n.1.




107. See Kuhn v. Vergiels, 558 F. Supp. 24 (D. Nev. 1982); Gerlacher v. Bd. of Regents
of Univ. of Houston, No. 14-95-00684-CV, 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 2645 (Tex. App. May
15, 1997); Montgomery v. Douglas, 388 F. Supp. 1139 (D. Colo. 1974); Black v. Sullivan,
561 F. Supp. 1050 (D. Me. 1983).
108. Sturgis, 368 F. Supp. at 43.
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Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the issue of tuition
residency requirements in relation to the Equal Protection clause.
C. Eastman v. University of Michigan
The opinions discussed above primarily focused on the
reasonableness of the purpose of the legislative intent behind the
residency requirements, but provided little discussion as to whether a
length of time of one year was in fact reasonable. The Court's
guidance in Vlandis suggested that a one-year requirement would be
valid as one element of other criteria used to determine a student's
domicile or residency for tuition purposes.
In 1994, addressing the constitutionality of a Michigan tuition
residency requirement, the Sixth Circuit questioned the statute's
legitimacy, focusing on whether a one-year requirement was
reasonably related to the State's interest in restricting preferential
tuition rates only to domiciliaries." 9 Like the statutes in Starns and
Sturgis, the Michigan statute required students seeking in-state tuition
to be domiciled in the state and to have resided there continuously for
not less than one year."'
The court first offered a brief description of the distinction
between the concepts of domicile and residence."' A domicile is a
"true, fixed and permanent home," while a residence requires both
physical presence and an intention to remain for some indefinite
period of time, "but not necessarily permanently."". The court found
that the University Residence Regulations inappropriately equated
residence with domicile."' The court then went on to distinguish
between domicile requirements and durational requirements, the
former being a legitimate use of state police power, and the latter
being an infringement on one's Equal Protection rights."'
The court stated that a bona fide residence requirement would
simply require that a person establish residence before demanding
the services that are restricted to residents, while "a durational
requirement imposed on a domiciliary or bona fide resident ... would
run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause."'15 The court found that
109. Eastman v. Univ. of Mich., 30 F.3d 671 (6th Cir. 1994).
110. I& at 672.
111. Based on the various judicial interpretations of the ambiguous "primarily for non-
educational purposes", one can presume that an individual could attain domiciliary status
as a student, provided she lives there for the entire year, and performs acts indicative of a
resident, like getting a driver's license and voter registration changed to the new state, and
signing a lease in the state.
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domicile can be obtained without the passage of any particular period
of time and that when a durational requirement is imposed on a
person who is a domiciliary, or bona fide resident of the state, it is
contrary to the legitimate state interest of restricting preferential
tuition rates to domiciliaries.1 6 The court ultimately remanded the
case back to the district court to clarify the Regulation's distinction
between domiciliaries and bona fide residents."7 The court's directive
was clear: one can establish domicile, as a bona fide resident, without
having stayed for an arbitrary length of time, like one year, and
durational residency requirements imposed on domiciliaries or bona
fide residents lack even a rational basis and thus violate the Equal
Protection Clause.ls
D. California Educational Code and Equal Protection
As is evident from the above cases, durational residency
requirements for in-state tuition have been almost universally
declared constitutional. Until higher education is recognized as either
a fundamental right or some form of basic necessity, durational
residency statutes will never be subject to strict scrutiny. However,
even without attaining the highest level of scrutiny, it seems plausible
that some tuition residency requirements, particularly those that
require one-year of residence before obtaining preferential tuition
rates, like the California statute, may still be struck down as
unconstitutional violations of Equal Protection.
When analyzed under rational basis review, the California
statute's requirements, even if presumptively valid, are unreasonable.
Requiring a student to reside in the state for at least a year, before
even applying for in-state classification, without offering any
opportunity to demonstrate bona fide residency and an intent to
remain in the state beyond graduation, is arbitrary. Adjudging
applicants on an individual basis, rather than by mass classification,
would adequately enable universities to balance their own objectives
without violating the constitutional rights of students. Accordingly,
under the authority of Shapiro, Dunn, Vlandis, and Sturgis, the






HI.Durational Residency Requirements and the Fourteenth
Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause
The Supreme Court's decision in Saenz v. Roe was remarkable
because it was based on the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment-a clause considered long dead in American
jurisprudence."9 In Saenz, the issue was the constitutionality of a
statute similar to the one challenged in Shapiro thirty years earlier.120
This time, the Supreme Court unpredictably relied on, and perhaps
resurrected, the Privileges or Immunities Clause to strike down a
statute that could have been invalidated under the well-established
Equal Protection analysis.' The Privilege or Immunities Clause was
invoked for only the second time since its fate was sealed in the
Slaughter-House Cases.'
Saenz v. Roe
In 1992, California enacted a statute that limited the amount of
welfare available to new residents of the state to the maximum
amount they would have received in their prior state of residency.'
3
The statute prevented newly arrived residents of California from
receiving the state's welfare benefits until they had been living there
for one year.' The original case began in 1997, when two California
residents challenged the constitutionality of the durational residency
requirement."
The State argued that the statute saved almost eleven million
dollars per year in welfare costs."6 Moreover, the cost savings
represented an appropriate exercise of budgetary authority as long as
the durational residency requirement didn't penalize the right to
travel. The district court disagreed and enjoined the
implementation of the statute, finding that in the proper comparison
between new and old residents, the statute served to penalize the new
residents." After the Court of Appeals affirmed the case, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
119. Tim A. Lemper, The Promise and Perils of "Privileges or Immunities". Sanez v.
Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999), 23 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 295 (1999).
120. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
121. Id. at 502; Lemper, supra note 119, at 295.
122. Lemper, supra note 119, at 295.
123. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 492.
124. Id.; see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450.03 (West 1999).
125. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 493-94.
126. Id. at 497.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 494.
129. Id. at 495.
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Rather than using Shapiro and Equal Protection as the
framework to determine whether the statute penalized the right to
travel, the majority invoked the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects the right of newly arrived
citizens to enjoy the same Privileges or Immunities enjoyed by other
citizens of the state. 30 Based on this rejuvenated constitutional
clause, the majority affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. 3 '
Given that the issue to be resolved in Saenz was much the same
as Shapiro, the Court could have used the existing Equal Protection
analysis. Justice Stevens justified not using Shapiro because the
standard of scrutiny to be applied under the circumstances was
debatable and not at all clear.' 2 It was apparent that the Court had
been grappling with an underlying conflict of finding a more explicit
source in the Constitution in which the fundamental right to travel
could be grounded.'33 The Court thus chose to reevaluate its
jurisprudence in hopes of securing a more stable footing on which to
base the right to travel."3
Justice Stevens identified three components of the right to travel.
They include (1) the right of a citizen of one state to enter and leave
another state, (2) the right to be treated as a welcome visitor when
temporarily present in another state, and (3) the right to be treated
like a citizen in a state when one chooses to permanently move
there.'35 Focusing on the third component, Justice Stevens held that,
"despite fundamentally differing views concerning the coverage of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, most
notably expressed in the majority and dissenting opinions of the
Slaughter-House Cases, it has always been common ground that this
Clause protects the.., right to travel."'36
He went on to say that a citizen's two political capacities, federal
and state, reinforced the claim that newly arrived citizens have the
same rights as others who share their citizenship. 3 7  Neither a
rationality standard nor an intermediate standard of review was
sufficient to judge the constitutionality of a state law that
discriminated against some of its citizens because they are domiciled
in the state for less than a year."3 "The appropriate standard may be
130. Id. at 502.
131. Id. at 511.
132. Id. at 498.
133. See David A. Donahue, Note, Penalizing the Poor: Durational Residency
Requirements For Welfare Benefits, 72 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 451,461 (1998).
134. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 493.
135. Id. at 501.
136. Id. at 503.
137. See id.
138. Id.
more categorical than that articulated in Shapiro, but it is surely no
less strict."' Moreover, since the right to travel embraces a citizen's
right to be treated equally in his new state of residence, a
discriminatory classification is itself a penalty, regardless of the
severity with which it affects the right to travel.
140
Narrowing the reach of its holding, Justice Stevens then
proceeded to create a distinction among other durational residency
requirements.14' He emphasized the relative immediacy of the welfare
benefit, noting that because whatever benefits received would be
consumed in California, there was no danger that they could be
received and carried away to another state, as are other, more
portable benefits.'42  In contrast, an individual might establish
residency just long enough to obtain "readily portable" benefits, such
as a divorce or a college education, and then move away to another
state. 43 By expressly distinguishing college education, Justice Stevens
may have quietly suffocated any hope that durational residency
requirements for in-state tuition might be declared unconstitutional
under a new Privileges or Immunities analysis.
Dissenting, Justice Rehnquist criticized the reasoning behind the
majority's "readily portable" distinction, and argued that it provided
little real guidance to lower courts that might apply the rationale in
the future." Specifically, he argued that tuition subsidies are
"consumed" in a state as much as any welfare benefits are, and it is
the benefit of the education, rather than the subsidy itself, that an
individual retains.45 Similarly, welfare benefits are consumed in a
state while granting an individual the means to learn job skills or
receive an education."' Justice Rehnquist's criticism was made in
support of his belief that the state law in Saenz was, in fact, a
legitimate use of police power.47 However, it is his reasoning, rather
than his conclusion, that lends strength to the argument that a
durational residency requirement for college tuition could still be
challenged under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The true promise of Saenz v. Roe for durational residency
requirements for in-state tuition is unclear. While the Supreme
Court's decision could conceivably breathe new life into the
139. Id.
140. Id. at 504-05.
141. See id. at 505.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 511-12 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 519.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 520.
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Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause, the extent
of its effect on constitutional law remains untested. Scholars who
have written about the implications of the case do not expect a
substantial impact. One scholar, outlining both the history of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause and the vision of the Rehnquist
Court, predicts that the effect of the decision will be less of an
expansion of recognized fundamental rights than an inauguration of
the present Court's peculiar jurisprudence.'48 In another article,
Professor Laurence Tribe discusses whether there might be a revival
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause that could eventually mean a
transplantation of substantive Due Process rights.49 He implies,
however, that the decision is more emblematic of the present Court's
attention to structure rather than substance, and doubts that Saenz
will bring about a significant change in the future."
The constitutionality of the California statute under a privileges
or immunities analysis is premised on the Court's understanding of
the immediacy and portability of higher education. When seen as a
portable benefit that can be gained in one state and later taken away
to another state, presumably to the first state's detriment, the
important interest in higher education will probably not provide all
the nations' students with access to the same public universities.
However, when viewed as a more immediately consumed benefit, or a
basic right, access to preferential tuition rates is a privilege that, when
provided by a state, should be provided to everyone equally.
Conclusion
Durational residency requirements for in-state tuition present
some important constitutional questions. While the United States
Supreme Court has addressed such requirements only in a limited
sense, the issue has been presented before various lower courts, and
twice summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court.5' Durational
residency requirements for in-state tuition have been challenged as
violative of Due Process and Equal Protection. Thus far, the only
standard of review ever applied by the courts is rational basis. One
district court, in the Sixth Circuit, found serious constitutional
problems with a Michigan durational residency requirement . Even
148. Lemper, supra note 119, at 298-306.
149. Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities
Revival Portend the Future-Or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 HARV. L. REV.
110 (1999).
150. Id. at 195.
151. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 453-54 (1973); see also Sturgis v. Washington,
368 F. Supp. 38, 38 (W.D. Wash. 1973), aff'd, 414 U.S. 1057 (1973); Starns v. Malkerson,
326 F. Supp. 234,238-39 (D. Minn. 1970)
152. Eastman, 30 F.3d at 673-74.
though the restrictions imposed on individuals by in-state tuition
statutes are often unreasonable, arbitrary, and implicate the right to
travel, no court has invalidated such statutes on Equal Protection or
Due Process grounds. Recently, the Supreme Court used the
Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause to
invalidate a residency requirement for welfare benefits."5 3 That
decision provides another angle from which to challenge durational
residency requirements for in-state tuition, but thus far it is an angle
that remains untested.
In a recent case, Markowitz v. Board of Directors Hastings
College of the Law, a San Francisco Superior Court judge granted the
defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings in a former
student's challenge to the Hastings residency policy-the equivalent
of California Education Code." 4 The plaintiff, despite obtaining a
California identification card, getting a job, paying taxes, and being
summoned to serve as a juror, was unable to gain residency status
from Hastings because he refused to disclose the financial
information of his parents, a requirement of the state statute for
proving financial independence.'55
The defendant argued that the existing tuition system "is a
rational and legitimate expression of California's interest in financing,
operating and maintaining its publicly financed institution of higher
education and providing residents of the state with a higher education
at a lower tuition rate."'56  The defendant further asserted that
California has a legitimate interest in not providing a financial
windfall of lowered tuition to non-residents.5  On a basic level, the
State and Hastings' justification was a matter of allocating tax dollars.
Despite the disposition of that specific case, the State's rationale,
when used broadly to classify enormous groups of out-of-state
applicants, is both logically flawed and constitutionally questionable.
As stated in Vlandis, a conclusive presumption of non-residence,
based on a student's out-of-state address, is "wholly unrelated" to the
objective of cost equalization.58 Furthermore, any administrative
ease achieved through mass classifications of out-of-state students
should not save a conclusive presumption of non-residence from
invalidity on Due Process grounds.
Under Equal Protection principles, the State's designation of
Markowitz as a non-resident, based on his refusal to submit his
parents' tax returns, was also unreasonable. Markowitz demonstrated
153. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S., 489,504-505 (1999).
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an intent to remain in California after his graduation from Hastings
when he moved to the state, got a job, got a California identification
card, and paid his own taxes. Whether his parents also paid
California taxes is unrelated to the State's tax allocation concerns and
an irrational manner of dealing with a new resident of the state. It
also seems unlikely that in his first year of law school, the time it
would take to meet the threshold durational requirement, Markowitz
would have had any taxable income to contribute to the state.
Therefore, California's interest in tax allocation is wholly unrelated to
the residency presumptions and thus, violates the Equal Protection
clause, even under the deferential rational basis standard of review.
The only question that remains is whether the Privileges or
Immunities Clause will provide students like Markowitz with any
more relief from the inequities of the California Education Code.
While new recognition of privileges or immunities might seem
promising, the Supreme Court's decision in Saenz appears to
foreclose any opportunity for equal distribution of in-state tuition
benefits. However, with that clause alive again, it is an excellent time
for the courts to squarely examine the status of higher education in
the constitutional spectrum and to properly address the importance of
providing all post-secondary education students with equal and
affordable access to the nation's public universities.

